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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
THE TRANSFER OF LITIGIOUS RIGHTS
IN LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW *
III. THE EXERCISE OF LITIGIOUS REDEMPTION-
ARTICLE 2652
Article 2652 of the Louisiana Civil Code authorizes the person
against whom a litigious right has been transferred to obtain a
release therefrom by paying to the transferee the real price of
the transfer, together with interest from its date.1 A transfer
which is subject to litigious redemption may also come under
the prohibition of nullity found in Article 2447 when the litigious
right is transferred to a public officer connected with a court.2 In
this latter instance the person against whom the litigious right is
transferred has the option either to invoke the nullity of the coda]
provision or to exercise the litigious redemption.3 It has been pre-
viously pointed out that neither Article 2447 nor Article 2652 is
applicable unless a "litigious right" is transferred and considera-
tion has been given to the problem of determining the litigious
character of the right.4 This portion of the comment will be de-
voted to a discussion of other problems incident to the application
of Article 2652, assuming, first of all, that the right transferred
has the necessary litigious character under the requisites previ-
ously discussed.5
Donations-Gratuitous Transfers
In order for the transfer of a litigious right to be subject to
the provisions of Article 2652, it is necessary as a general rule that
284, 61 N.W. 971, 33 L.R.A. 492 (1895); Beck v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 63 N.J.
Law 232, 43 At. 908, 76 Am. St. Rep. 211 (1899); Colaizzi v. Pennsylvania R.
Co., 208 N.Y. 275, 101 N.E. 859 (1913); Johnson v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co.,
163 Pa. St. Rep. 127, 29 Atl. 854 (1894).
• This is the second and concluding installment of the present comment,
the first part having appeared in the March 1939 issue, 1 LOUISIANA LAW RE-
viEW 593-607. For an excellent recent contribution to the legal literature on
the same subject see Comment, The Sale of a Litigious Right (1939) 13 Tu-
lane L. Rev. 448-460.
1. Art. 2652, La. Civil Code of 1870. See p. 593, supra.
2. Art. 2447, La. Civil Code of 1870. See discussion at pp. 602 et seq.,
supra.
3. 11 Beudant, Cours de Drolt Civil Frangais (2 ed. 1938) 332, no 402,
note 2. In most cases it will be to the advantage of the party against whom
the transfer has been made to exercise the litigious redemption of Article
2652 since invoking the nullity of Article 2447 does not terminate the liti-
gation. Illg and Valentino v. Regan, 166 La. 70, 116 So. 673 (1928).
4. See discussion at pp. 595-602, supra.
5. The principal inquiry is whether a contestation on the basis of the as-
serted right (contestation sur le fond du droit) existed at the time of the
transfer. See p. 600, supra.
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it be made in consideration of a price.6 From this it follows that
only sales or onerous transfers (in which the equivalent of a price
can be found) are contemplated. The donation of a right in liti-
gation is not, therefore, subject to redemption.7 In fact, a gratui-
tous transfer is not only outside of the spirit of Article 2652 but
furthermore the redemption is technically impossible in such a
case for lack of a price or monetary consideration to be paid to
the transferee."
While it is unanimously admitted that the motive of Article
2652 (i.e., the suppression of the speculative purchase of litiga-
tion) does not apply to the case of a donation, difficulties arise
when a litigious right is tranferred by a donation imposing cer-
tain charges on the doneeY According to the French commenta-
tors, the courts in such a situation must ascertain the intention
of the transferor from the nature and extent of the charge im-
posed and from the circumstances of the particular case.10 If this
objective test shows that the dominant intention was to make a
true donation, the redemption of the litigious right should not be
permitted despite the imposition of charges upon the donee.' On
the other hand, if the onerous character of the transfer predomi-
nates, the redemption should be admitted under Article 2652.12
6. For example, in the case of the pact "de quota lirts" (i.e., an agency
coupled with an interest if suit by the agent is successful) litigious redemp-
tion is denied for lack of a "price." 19 Baudry-Lacantinerie, Trait6 Th~orique
et Pratique de Droit Civil (3 ed. 1908) 947, no 935. But see contra: 2 Guil-
louard, Trait~s de la Vente et de l'change (2 ed. 1891) 433-434, no 892.
7. 10 Planiol et Ripert, Trait6 Pratique de Droit Civil Frangais (1932)
358, no 317; 5 Aubry et Rau, Cours de Droit Civil Frangais (5 ed. 1907) 247,
§ 359quater, note 14; 19 Baudry-Lacantinerie, op. cit. supra note 6, at 944,
no 931: "Il n'est pas admissible qu'on lut enldve le bdn~fice do la cession, sans
aucune restitution . . . le donataire d'un droit litigieux n'est pas l'acheteur
do procs dont on a voulu enrayer la spdculation. Les motifs qui ont fait
dtablir le retrait litigieux ne lui sont pas applicables."
"It is inadmissible that the benefit of the transfer be taken from him
without any restitution . . . the donee of a litigious right is not the pur-
chaser of lawsuits whose speculation it Is desired to arrest. The motives
which caused the establishment of litigious redemption are not applicable
to him." (Translation supplied.)
8. Independent Ice & Distilled Water Mfg. Co. v. Anderson, 106 La. 95,
30 So. 272 (1901).
9. Cf. Arts. 1523, 1524, 1525, 1526, 1530, La. Civil Code of 1870.
10. 5 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 7, at 247, § 359quater, note 14;
10 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 7, at 359, no 317. Cf. Troplong, Le
Droit Civil Expliqu6, de la Vente, II (5 ed. 1856) 505-508, no 1009.
11. 19 Baudry-Lacantinerie, op. cit. supra note 6, at 944-945, no 932.
12. 19 Baudry-Lacantinerie, op. cit. supra note 6, at 945, no 932, rejects
the possibility of splitting the transaction into two separate contracts-one
gratuitous and the other onerous-and treating each one separately. Such
an arbitrary division would be contrary to the intention of the parties, and
where only a single agreement was made the contract must be identified as
one unit, either as gratuitous or onerous.
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If a price has been paid secretly, this is a species of fraud and the
litigious redemption may be exercised. 18
Exchange
There is a sharp conflict in the French commentators on the
question of whether litigious redemption can be effected when
the transfer is by means of an exchange rather than a sale. A
number of the French writers are inclined to extend the rule to
cover such a situation." These authorities reason that Article
1707 of the Code Napoleon broadly declares all of the provisions
relative to sale applicable to the contract of exchange and conse-
quently the litigious redemption of Article 1699 should apply to
an exchange. Under this view, since there is no monetary price,
the redemptor may invoke Article 1699 by reimbursing the trans-
feree the value in money of the thing given by the transferee to
the transferor. A respectable group of the French commentators,
however, express the contrary opinion, taking the view that the
faculty of exercising the redemption ceases by virtue of the im-
possibility of reimbursing to the transferee the same thing ceded
to the transferor.15
Only one decision appears to have raised this problem under
the provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code, and here the court did
not consider the point because on other grounds it refused to
order the remand of the case in which this question of litigious
redemption would have had to be considered. 16 In the solution of
this open question it is hard to escape the logical reasoning ad-
vanced by those French commentators who would permit litigi-
ous redemption in a case of exchange. A construction of the Loui-
siana codal provisions should lead to a similar result. 7 Moreover,
13. Troplong, op. cit. supra note 10, at 504, no 1009.
14. 5 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 7, at 253-254, § 359quater, note
32ter; Troplong, op. cit. supra note 10, at 498, no 1002; 6 Marcad6, Explica-
tion du Code Civil (7 ed. 1875) 369.
15. 2 Colin et Capitant, Cours aidmentaire de Droit Civil Frangais (8 ed.
1935) 566, no 623; 19 Baudry-Lacantinerie, op. cit. supra note 6, at 946, no
933; 24 Laurent, Principes de Droit Civil Frangais (1877) 575, no 582; 2 Guil-
louard, op. cit. supra note 6, at 429, 430, no 888.
16. Gulf Refining Co. v. Glassell, 185 La. 143, 168 So. 755 (1936). The
question was squarely presented by the facts and was fully discussed in the
briefs filed in support of the motion to remand. The court's refusal to re-
mand the case followed by affirmance of the lower court's judgment, Gulf
Refining Co. v. Glassell, 186 La. 190, 171 So. 846 (1936), made it unnecessary
for the court to consider the issue. The Glassell case also raised the prob-
lem of the applicability of Article 2652 to a universal transfer made pursu-
ant to a corporate reorganization.
17. Art. 2667, La. Civil Code of 1870: "All the other provisions relative to
the contract of sale apply to the contract of exchange. And in this last con-
tract each of the parties is individually considered both as vendor and
vendee."
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if the transfer of a litigious right by exchange is to be excluded
from the application of Article 2652, the necessary result is to add
another exception to the limited enumeration of Article 2654.
Since a contrary interpretation would open an easy avenue for
avoiding the operation of Article 2652, the view which includes
exchange in the category of transfers subject to litigious redemp-
tion should be adopted when this question is presented to the
Louisiana courts for decision.
Public and Judicial Sales
Article 2652 does not, according to its terms, make any dis-
tinction between private sales and public sales and consequently
suggests the problem of whether litigious redemption is admitted
in judicial sales or in sales at public auction. 8 The French juris-
prudence now holds that a transfer made by means of a judicial
sale gives rise to the litigious redemption. 9 This view is, with only
a slight exception, ° supported by the commentators who consider
that Article 1699 of the French Civil Code covers all public sales
(i.e., sales at public auction and judicial sales) as well as private
sales. 2 1 The Louisiana jurisprudence is to the contrary, holding
that Article 2652 has no application to judicial sales.2 2 The Loui-
siana cases do not directly raise the question of litigious redemp-
tion as applied to a sale at public auction not pursuant to an
order of court. Language used in the Louisiana cases limiting the
application of Article 2652 to "conventional sales" should be con-
strued as including sales at public auction other than judicial
sales within the scope of the litigious redemption. While the
Louisiana cases do not appear to have given any adequate con-
sideration to the French authorities dealing with the problem
under discussion, there is much that may be said in favor of the
18. See Arts. 2601-2625, La. Civil Code of 1870.
19. Req. 14 juillet 1868, Dalloz 1871. 5. 342, Sirey 1869. 1. 28; Req. 30 juin
1880, Dalloz 1881. 1. 52, Sirey 1881. 1. 59; Req. 16 janvier 1883, Dalloz 1883. 1.
293, Sirey 85. 1. 111; Paris, 2 f~vrier 886, Sirey 1868. 2. 16.
20. See criticism in 2 Colin et Capitant, op. cit. supra note 15, at 565, 566,
no 623.
21. 10 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 7, at 358, no 317: V.. i'inter-
ventiom du juge ne supprime pas Zes chances de spdculation" (the interven-
tion of the judge does not eliminate the possibility of speculation). 19 Baudry-
Lacantinerie, op. cit. supra note 6, at 947-948, no 936; 5 Aubry et Rau, op.
cit. supra note 7, at 247, § 359quater, note 14; 2 Guillouard, op. cit. supra note
6, at 431-433, no 891. Baudry-Lacantinerie states that if litigious rights are
sold at public auction with non-litigious rights the price shall be apportioned
and the redemption admitted; see discussion at p. 823, infra.
22. Early v. Black, 12 La. 205 (1838); Succession of Tilghman, 11 Rob. 124
(La. 1845); D'Apremont v. Berry, 6 La. Ann. 464 (1851); Blueflelds S. S. Co.
v. Lala Ferreras Cangelosi S. S. Co., 133 La. 424, 63 So. 96 (1913).
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present Louisiana rule. In judicial sales the possibility of a re-
demption under Article 2652 might so seriously discourage bid-
ders as to hamper a court in effecting a judicial sale that might
be necessary for the orderly administration of justice.23 On the
other hand, in excepting even one form of public sale (judicial
sale) from the application of Article 2652, the court in reality is
adding to the enumerated exclusions listed in Article 2654.24
Partial Transfer of a Litigious Right
A partial transfer of a litigious right may take place either
when the sole owner of the right transfers a portion thereof or
when one of several co-owners transfers his entire partial inter-
est in the thing in litigation. In either case, the exercise of rights
under Article 2652 will not operate to end the litigation, which is
one of the principal objects of litigious redemption.25 From this
premise, it has been argued that the exercise of the redemption
is not possible in the situation in which there is a partial trans-
fer of a litigious right. In Smith v. Cook,26 where a portion of the
thing in litigation was transferred during the pendency of the
suit, the court rejected this argument and permitted the defend-
ant to avail himself of Article 2652. It was pointed out that any
other decision would make it comparatively easy for a transferor
to avoid the operation of the rule simply by retaining a small in-
terest in the thing in litigation. While the redemption in this
particular situation may not have the effect of ending the entire
suit it does pro tanto operate to terminate the asserted right inso-
23. See Arts. 647, 690, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
24. Litigious redemption can also be exercised when the transfer is by
means of compromise having for its purpose the ending of litigation, 10
Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 7, at 358, no 317.
25. Cf. 19 Baudry-Lacantinerie, op. cit. supra note 6, at 964, no 961:
"J'at une cr~ance Ztigieuse contre Paul; je meurs laissant deux hdritiers,
Primus et Becundus. Primus code 4 Secundus sa part dans la crdance liti-
gieuse. Paul ne pourra pas exercer le retrait .... le but du retrait, qul est
V'extinction du procds, ne peut dtre atteint dans Pespdce proposde; car s le
retraft 4tait possible, il ne pourrait 6tre exercd que pour la portion de creance
qui a fait l'objet de la cession; Secundus conserverait donc l'autre portion
qui lut appartient de son chef, et le procs continuerait pour cette portion."
"I have a litigious claim against Paul; I die leaving two heirs, Primus
and Secundus. Primus transfers to Secundus his share of the litigious claim.
Paul will not be able to exercise the redemption. . . . the purpose of re-
demption, which is the extinction of litigation, cannot be attained in the case
proposed, because, if redemption were possible, it could only be exercised for
the portion of the claim which was the object of the transfer; Secundus
would thus retain the other portion which belongs to him in his own right,
and the suit would continue for that portion." (Translation supplied.)
26. 189 La. 632, 180 So. 469 (1938).
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far as it pertains to the portion or interest which is the subject
matter of the partial transfer.27
Transfer of a Litigious Right Confusedly with Non-Litigious
Rights
A similar problem of interest is the question of the appli-
cability of Article 2652 to a situation in which a right in litigation
is sold with other property or rights not litigious in character for
a single and lump price. Can litigious redemption be invoked in
this situation? No Louisiana authority has been found on this
problem although the question was raised in one case.28 The reas-
oning used in Smith v. Cook as to a partial transfer is likewise ap-
plicable to this situation; that is, the redemptor has substantive
rights under Article 2652 which should be protected against pos-
sible circumventing devices. Moreover, the French commentators
express the opinion that redemption of the litigious right ,should
be admitted in this situation and that an apportionment of the
price must be made in order to determine the amount of reim-
bursement due to the transferee. 29 It is submitted that a similar
result should be permitted under our codal provision and this
seems to be a logical implication from Smith v. Cook.
Miscellaneous Problems
It will be noted that Article 2652 is found in the chapter of
the Louisiana Civil Code dealing with the assignment or transfer
of credits or other incorporeal rights.3 0 This suggests the problem
of whether Article 2652 is limited in its application to the trans-
fer of a litigious right viewed solely in the sense of incorporeal
property, or whether it also contemplates the transfer of a cor-
poreal thing, the ownership of which is litigious.", The French
authorities unanimously agree that the corresponding provisions
of the French Civil Code3 2 include not only the transfer of all
kinds of litigious "rights"-movable, immovable, personal or real
27. 189 La. at 643-644, 180 So. at 473. See Symposium, The Work of the
Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1937-1938 Term (1939) 1 LOUISANA LAW RE-
viEw 314, 348.
28. Gulf Refining Co. v. Glassell, 185 La. 143, 168 So. 755 (1936).
29. 10 Planlol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 7, at 364, no 321; 19 Baudry-
Lacantinerie, op. cit. supra note 6, at 948, no 936.
30. La. Civil Code of 1870, Title VII, Chapter 12, "Of the Assignment or
Transfer of Credits and Other Incorporeal Rights."
31. For example, if A is suing B in a petitory action claiming ownership
of immovable property, does it make any difference if A transfers to X the
ownership of the property claimed rather than transferring to him his
"right" in the pending litigation with B? Should litigious redemption be ad-
mitted in both cases?
32. Arts. 1699, 1700, French Civil Code.
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-but that the provisions apply equally where an immovable sub-
ject to litigation is sold, even though there may have been no ex-
press mention of the transfer of a "right."33 The Louisiana juris-
prudence is in accord with this view.34
The French authorities are divided on the availability of liti-
gious redemption where a defendant in possession of an immov-
able transfers or sells it during the pendency of the plaintiff's ac-
tion in revendication. One group of the commentators deny liti-
gious redemption in this case.3 5 Baudry-Lacantinerie argues that
since the defendant in possession has sold an immovable which
he has the power to deliver, a litigious "right" has not been trans-
ferred and, therefore, he concludes that the plaintiff in the reven-
dication action cannot acquire the immovable by means of liti-
gious redemption.3 6 This viewpoint finds support in the French
jurisprudence 37 but is severely criticized by a number of the com-
mentators who argue that Article 1699 of the Code Napoleon
makes no distinction between the transfer of a litigious right by
the plaintiff or defendant and that, since the pendency of the ac-
33. 10 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 7, at 359, no 318; 19 Baudry-
Lacantinerie, op. cit. supra note 6, at 948, no 937; 2 Guillouard, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 434-435, no 893.
34. Litigious redemption has been admitted in the following cases: Lang-
ston v. Shaw, 147 La. 644, 85 So. 624 (1920) (transfer of immovable prop-
erty); Smith v. Cook, 189 La. 631, 180 So. 469 (1938) (transfer of mineral
rights and immovable property); Spears v. Jackson, 30 La. Ann. 523 (1878)
(transfer of mortgage note). Redemption has been sought in many cases
involving the transfer of a variety of rights corporeal and incorporeal, and
although the provisions of Article 2652 have been deemed applicable the
redemption was denied on the ground that the right was not litigious or that
the redemption was not timely exercised. See Marshall v. McCrea, 2 La.
Ann. 79 (1847); Billiot v. Robinson, 13 La. Ann. 529 (1858); Bernheim v. Pes-
sou, 143 La. 609, 79 So. 23 (1918). See also Gilkerson-Sloss Commission Co.
v. Bond, 44 La. Ann. 841, 11 So. 220 (1892); Independent Ice & Distilled Water
Mfg. Co. v. Anderson, 106 La. 95, 30 So. 272 (1901); Blueflelds S. S. Co. v. Lala
Ferreras Cangelosi S. S. Co., 133 La. 424, 63 So. 96 (1913).
35. 19 Baudry-Lacantinerie, op. cit. supra note 6, at 949-951, no 938; 10
Huc, Commentaire Th~orique et Pratique du Code Civil (1897) 320-322, no 238.
36. 19 Baudry-Lacantinerie, op. cit. supra note 6, at 950, 951, no 938,
argues that litigious redemption is for the purpose of letting a person "get
himself released" from the claim in litigation. With regard to the right in
litigation, the redemptor's role is a passive one as where the transfer is made
by a plaintiff in revendication and redemption is exercised by the defend-
ant. Thus where a complete transfer of the property is made by the de-
fendant in possession, there is nothing from which the plaintiff is to "get
himself released" since no demand has ever been on him-he was the one
who started the litigation. However, where suit is Instituted to have a debt
declared discharged and the defendant transfers his claim, litigious redemp-
tion may be exercised by the plaintiff.
37. Req. 22 juillet 1851, Dalloz 1851. 1. 265, Sirey 1851. 1. 567; Alger, 20
janvier 1866, Dalloz 1868. 1. 374, Sirey 1868. 1. 438; Req. 27 janvier 1931, Dal-
loz 1931. 97.
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tion operates to make the ownership litigious, the redemption
should be permitted. 8
There is no direct Louisiana authority discussing the effect
of a transfer by a defendant in possession and the question may
be regarded as an open one.39 However, it must be recognized
that, if Article 2652 is admitted to cover the sale of an immovable
in litigation as well as a "right" in litigation, it is difficult to ex-
clude the application of litigious redemption whether the sale be
by a claimant plantiff or by a defendant in possession. This is
possibly the broad implication to be drawn from Langston v.
Shaw."°
Conditions to the Exercise of Litigious Redemption
Reimbursement. In order to permit the exercise of litigious
redemption the Louisiana codal provision requires reimbursement
to the transferee of "the real price of the transfer, together with
interest from its date."' 1 If the price mentioned in the sale is not
the "real price" but has, through simulation, been augmented to
make litigious redemption more difficult, this is a species of fraud
which may be established by parol evidence since the article re-
38. 10 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 7, at 359, no 318: "En ce qui
concerne Ze droft de propridtd, la jurisprudence paraft exiger, pour P'exercice
du retrait, que Is cddant ne soit pas, au jour de la cession, en possession du
bien sur 1equel porte Is droit cddd. Cette solution doit dtre critiqude; si le
cddant est un possesseur poursuivi en revendication par un tiers, pourquoi
le tiers ne pourrat-l pas exercer Zo retrait contre Ie cessionnairef Le Code
a parid de retrait des droits litigieux et non pas des crdances litigieuses."
"Concerning the right of ownership, the jurisprudence apparently exacts,
for the exercise of redemption, that the transferor on the day of the transfer
be not in possession of the property to which the ceded right appertains.
This solution must be criticized; if the transferor is a possessor pursued in
an action in revendication by a third person, why cannot this third person
exercise the redemption against the transferee? The Code speaks of redemp-
tion of litigious rights and not of litigious credits." (Translation supplied.)
See also 2 Guillouard, op. cit. supra note 6, at 437, no 893.
39. The Louisiana cases have not discussed the effect of the defendant's
possession. In Langston v. Shaw, 147 La. 644, 85 So. 624 (1920), it was held
that, since Articles 2652 and 2653 make no distinction between the plaintiff
and defendant, the plaintiff was entitled to exercise the litigious redemption
under Article 2652. The facts of the case seem to indicate that the defendant
transferor was in possession of the property transferred but no consideration
was given to that fact by the court.
Query: When an immovable Is transferred by a defendant pending liti-
gation, does the failure of the plaintiff to file a notice of lis pendens under
La. Act 22 of 1904 affect In any manner the plaintiff's right to litigious re-
demption? Cf. 19 Baudry-Lancantinerie, op. cit. supra note 6, at 962, no 957.
40. 147 La. 644, 646, 85 So. 624, 625 (1920): "The articles of the Code,
dealing with the purchase of a litigious right, do not seem to be confined to
either side of a lawsuit."
41. Art. 2652, La. Civil Code of 1870.
1939]
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quires only reimbursement of the "real price. '42 If a "real price"
larger than that set forth in an act of sale is established by a
counter-letter, the price named in the act of sale, rather than the
price fixed in the counter-letter will control as the party exer-
cising the redemption is considered a "third person" against
whom the counter-letter cannot have effect.'8
If a transferee of the litigious right has resold the right for a
different price than that of the original transfer, there is a conflict
in the French authorities regarding which price is to be reim-
bursed. According to one viewpoint, the second transferee can-
not acquire greater rights than his transferor and the redemption
may be effected upon payment of the price of the first transfer.4
On the other hand, some commentators consider that, since full
reimbursement is a condition of litigious redemption, repayment
must be made of the actual price paid by the second transferee
in order that he sustain no loss."5
Interest on the price of the transfer must also be reimbursed
to the transferee under the Louisiana article."6 The correspond-
ing provision of the French Civil Code specifically provides that
interest is to be computed from the day on which the transferee
has paid the price.'7 While our Article 2652 indicates that the in-
terest is to be computed from the date of the transfer, 4 it is sub-
42. 11 Beudant, op. cit. supra note 3, at 333, no 403; 19 Baudry-Lacanti-
nerie, op. cit. supra note 6, at 953, 954, no 943; 10 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit.
supra note 7, at 364, no 321 (1).
43. 11 Beudant, op. cit. supra note 3, at 333, no 403. Cf. Art. 2239, La. Civil
Code of 1870, as amended by La. Act 5 of 1884.
44. 2 Guillouard, op. cit. supra note 6, at 448-450, no 903.
45. 19 Baudry-Lacantinerie, op. cit. supra note 6, at 955, no 945; 10 Planiol
et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 7, at 364, no 321(1).
46. Art. 2652, La. Civil Code of 1870.
47. French Civil Code, Art. 1699: "COelu contre lequel on a cddd un droit
ltigieux peut s'en faire tenir quitte par le cessionnaire, en lui remboursant le
prix rdel de la cession avec lea frals et loyaux coats, et avec les intrts d
compter du jour oi le cessionnaire a payd Ie prix de la cession 4 Zu4 faite."
Art. 1699: "He against whom a litigious right has been transferred, may
get himself released by paying to the transferee the real price of the trans-
fer together with the expenses and fair costs and with interest to be cal-
culated from the time that the transferee paid the price of the transfer made
to him." (Translation supplied.)
Cf. 19 Baudry-Lacantinerie, op. cit. supra note 6, at 955-956, no 947.
48. The Civil Codes of 1808, 1825 and 1870 have all differed from the
phraseology of Art. 1699, French Civil Code, in this respect. See La. Civil
Code of 1808, pp. 868, 369, 3. 7. 130; Art. 2622, La. Civil Code of 1825; and Art.
2652, La. Civil Code of 1870. "Interest from its date" as used in the Louisiana
article may, however, be given the construction of referring to the "price"
rather than the "transfer," and this interpretation would be in harmony with
the French authorities.
In the case of Spears v. Jackson, 30 La. Ann. 523 (1878), the sale was
obviously on a cash basis, and therefore this decision is not an obstacle to
the above suggestion. See notes 56, 64, infra.
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mitted that this article should be construed in harmony with the
French authorities so as to allow interest only from the date on
which the price has been paid and not from the date of the trans-
fer when there has been a sale with a term for payment. 9 Inter-
est, where payable, would be computed at the legal rate.50
It should be observed that the French Civil Code, in addition
to reimbursement of the price and interest, requires the redemp-
tor to pay to the transferee "expenses and fair costs."5' "Ex-
penses" means the expenses of the transfer contract in the sense
of Article 1593 of the French Civil Code, and does not include the
transferee's loss of profit.5 2 The "costs" to be reimbursed are those
incident to the conduct of the pending litigation from which the
redemption is effected. 58 The Louisiana codal provision is silent
on the reimbursement of "expenses" and "costs," but the prac-
tice has been to order the reimbursement of costs as a condition
to the exercise of the redemption." It is very probable that the
expenses of the sale should also be paid by the redemptorA'
Timely Exercise of the Redemption. The Louisiana juris-
prudence construing Article 2652 has adopted a strict view re-
quiring the redemptor to act with diligence in exercising the
redemption. Thus it is well settled that a person entitled to invoke
litigious redemption may not fight the case on its merits until
it is apparent that the case is lost and, at the last moment, exer-
cise the redemption.56 Some of the French commentators indi-
49. Since the redemptor assumes the arrangement of the transferee, he
must make payment to the transferor (instead of to the transferee) and he
can take advantage of the term granted for payment. However, he must pro-
tect the transferee and present adequate surety against any loss that might
be incurred by his non-payment. 19 Baudry-Lacantinerie, op. cit. supra note
6, at 954, no 944. See also 10 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 7, at 364,
no 321.
50. Art. 2924, La. Civil Code of 1870.
51. "Les fras et loyaux coats." Art. 1699, French Civil Code.
52. 11 Beudant, op. cit. supra note 3, at 333, no 403; 2 Guillouard, op. cit.
supra note 6, at 451, no 906. Cf. the corresponding provision of Art. 2466, La.
Civil Code of 1870: "The expenses of the act or other incidental costs of sale
are chargeable to the buyer, unless some agreement be made to the contrary."
53. 2 Planiol, Trait6 2lmentaire de Droit Civil (11 ed. 1937) 604, no 1655;
2 Guillouard, op. cit. supra note 6, at 451, no 906; 10 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit.
supra note 7, at 364, no 821(4).
54. In Spears v. Jackson, 30 La. Ann. 523 (1878), it was held that the
transferee could recover the price paid, legal interest from the date of the
transfer and costs up to the date on which the redemptor filed his answer
urging the plea of litigious redemption.
55. The expenses would apparently be those for which the transferee as
a buyer had been responsible under Art. 2466, La. Civil Code of 1870.
56. Leftwich v. Brown, 4 La. Ann. 104 (1849); Rhodes v. Hooper, 6 La.
Ann. 355 (1851); Salbadore v. Crescent Mutual Ins. Co., 22 La. Ann. 338 (1870);
Evans v. De L'Isle, 24 La. Ann. 248 (1872); Cucullo v. Hernandez, 103 U.S. 150,
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cate that the redemption may be exercised at any time before
judgment and that it may be invoked even on the eve of the ad-
judication that will terminate the litigation.57 The stricter Loui-
siana rule, which requires prompt and timely exercise of the
redemption, seems preferable. Although, as a general rule, re-
demption must be exercised before the termination of the liti-
gation, an exception must be recognized when the transferee has
kept the transfer a secret or off the records for the purpose of
avoiding redemption.5 8
Manner of Exercising Litigious Redemption. No particular
formality is required in order to exercise litigious redemption."
When the transfer is effected while the suit is pending, the re-
demptor may usually raise the issue by motion setting forth the
facts of the transfer, coupled with a prayer to be relieved under
Article 26 52.:0 The issue may even be raised in the defendant's
answer."' A real tender, while not required, may be made, and a
tender made in open court coupled with a prayer for redemption
will stop the running of interest and subsequent costs.6 2  If the
transfer is effected subsequent to judgment, the redemption may
be exercised, during the delays for appeal, by appropriate motion
in the lower court. But if an appeal is already pending, it is nec-
essary to remand the case, upon simple motion of the party in
26 L.Ed. 322 (1880); Troplong, op. cit. supra note 10, at 494-495, no 999. See
also Marshall v. McCrea, 2 La. Ann. 79 (1847).
57. 19 Baudry-Lacantinerie, op. cit. supra note 6, at 943, no 930. Cf. 6
Marcad6, op. cit. supra note 14, at 370.
58. 10 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 7, at 363, no 321; 19 Baudry-
Lacantinerie, op. cit. supra note 6, at 943, 944, no 930; 6 Marcad6, op. cit. supra
note 14, at 370-371.
59. 19 Baudry-Lacantinerie, op. cit. supra note 6, at 951, no 939; 10 Planiol
et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 7, at 364, no 321(4). But the action cannot be
exercised collaterally as by intervention or third opposition, a direct civil
action being necessary. Gilkerson-Sloss Commission Co. v. Bond, 44 La. Ann.
841, 845, 11 So. 220, 221 (1892).
60. Lavigne v. Louisiana Ry. & Navigation Co., 12 La. App. 275, 124 So.
609 (1929). See also Marshall v. McCrea, 2 La. Ann. 79 (1847).
61. Spears v. Jackson, 30 La. Ann. 523 (1878). See also Sanders v. Ditch,
110 La. 883, 34 So. 860 (1903), In which the pleadings set forth in the answer
were dealt with as an exception.
62. See Arts. 166, 404, 415-417, La. Code of Practice of 1870. In Spears v.
Jackson, 30 La. Ann. 523, 528 (1878), the court said: "Scott's administrator
(Jackson] was entitled to get himself released by paying the real price of
the transfer, as provided by article 2652 of the Code; and if he had made a
real tender of the amount, with interest and costs up to the date of the
tender, and had deposited the money, subject to the order of King, he would
have been discharged from all liability. Not having done this, the inter-
venor [King] is entitled to recover the price paid by him for the claim, with
legal interest from the date of the transfer, and the costs up to the date of
the filing of Jackson's answer setting up the plea of litigious right, as d*-
cided by the district court." See also Billiot v. Robinson, 13 La. Ann. 529,
536 (1858).
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interest, for appropriate proceedings designed to effect the re-
demption.68 Litigious redemption may be effected by voluntary
agreement between the transferor and transferee, and such an
amicable agreement will terminate the suit under the conditions
of Article 2652.64
Legal Effects of Redemption
According to the commentators, litigious redemption effects
a retroactive substitution of the redemptor for the transferee
The redemptor is considered as having been the initial purchaser
of the litigious right rather than a transferee of the right. Since
in legal theory the original transferee is considered as never hav-
ing had any rights, the commentators express the view that all
rights created by or against the transferee in the interim between
the sale of a litigious right and the date of its redemption are con-
sidered as non-existent. Thus a seizure of the right or a mortgage
will be without effect against the redemptor.6 6 A similar result
would follow with regard to any real right established by the
original transferee.6 7 The redemption does not operate as a nova-
tion and, accordingly, has no effect upon the relationship between
the transferor and the transferee.68 If the price has not been paid
at the time of redemption the transferor may still exact payment
from the transferee,6 9 and there is also authority supporting a
direct action by the transferor against the redemptor in this sit-
uation.7 0 Finally, the transferee against whom the redemption is
exercised has no action against the transferor for the damage sus-
tained as a result of the redemption in the absence of a special
express warranty applicable to litigious redemption.71
63. See Art. 906, La. Code of Practice of 1870; Bluefields S. S. Co. v. Lala
Ferreras Cangelosi S. S. Co., 133 La. 423, 63 So. 96 (1913); Langston v. Shaw,
174 La. 644, 85 So. 624 (1920); Smith v. Cook, 189 La. 631, 180 So. 649 (1938).
Cf. Gulf Refining Co. v. Glassell, 185 La. 143, 168 So. 755 (1936), where the
Supreme Court refused to remand prior to passing upon the trial court's
action in sustaining an exception of no cause of action. For a criticism of the
holding of this case, see Comment (1939) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 593, 601.
64. See 19 Baudry-Lacantinerie, op. cit. supra note 6, at 951, no 939.
65. 10 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 7, at 365, no 322; 11 Beudant,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 334, no 404; 19 Baudry-Lacantinerie, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 959-960, no 953.
66. 10 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 7, at 365, no 322.
67. 19 Baudry-Lacantinerie, op. cit. supra note 6, at 960, no 953; 11 Beu-
dant, op. cit. supra note 3, at 334, no 404; 2 Colin et Capitant, op. cit. supra
note 15, at 567, no 625.
68. 19 Baudry-Lacantinerie, op. cit. supra note 6, at 960-961, no 954.
69. 11 Beudant, op. cit. supra note 3, at 335, no 405.
70. 10 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 7, at 366, no 322; 2 Colin et
Capitant, op. cit. supra note 15, at 567-568, no 625.
71. 10 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 7, at 365, no 322; 19 Baudry-
Lacantinerie, op. cit. supra note 6, at 961, no 955, suggests that there might
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Transfers Excepted from Litigious Redemption
Article 2654 recognizes three exceptions to the application of
litigious redemption. First, "when the transfer has been made to
a coheir or to the coproprietor of the right." This exception is
founded upon a policy of encouraging the peaceable settlement of
interests represented by ownership in indivision7 2 and also rec-
ognizes that the element of speculation is not so likely to be pres-
ent in a transfer to a coproprietor of the right.7 Although no
such restriction is expressly included in Article 1701 of the French
Civil Code (corresponding to Article 2654, Louisiana Civil Code
of 1870), the commentators deny the application of this particu-
lar excception to a transfer by a third person to one of the copro-
prietors of the right.1' In other words, it is considered that the
exception was intended to adopt the view of Pothier who denied
litigious redemption when the transfer was to a coheir or copro-
prietor by his coproprietor.75 This exception would include any
form of co-ownership, even coproprietorship resulting from a con-
tract of partnership or joint adventure.76
The second exception enumerated in Article 2654 is that of
a dation en paiement to a creditor as payment for a debt due to
him.77 This exception is founded upon the theory that the ele-
ment of speculation is not likely to be present in a dation en paie-
ment, but that the creditor has accepted the only thing that the
debtor could give to him in payment of the debt.78 The dation en
paiement must be in good faith; if the parties have fraudulently
or fictitiously created a debtor-creditor relationship as a means
be an action for breach of warranty when the transferor has failed to make
it known to the transferee that the right is being contested by litigation.
This would seem to follow from Arts. 2475, 2476, La. Civil Code of 1870.
72. Cf. Art. 1289, La. Civil Code of 1870: "No one can be compelled to hold
property with another, unless the contrary has been agreed upon; any one
has a right to demand the division of a thing held in common, by the action
of partition."
73. 11 Beudant, op. cit. supra note 3, at 336, no 406; 2 Colin et Capitant,
op. cit. supra note 15, at 565, no 628; 10 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 7,
at 366, no 323.
74. 5 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 7, at 254, § 359quater, note 33.
75. 1 Pothier, Treatise on the Contract of Sale (Cushing's Translation
1839) 358, no 594.
76. 10 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 7, at 366, no 323.
77. The dat4on en patement is dealt with in Arts. 2655-2659, La. Civil Code
of 1870.
78. 24 Laurent, op. cit. supra note 15, at 597, no 608; 19 Baudry-Lacan-
tinerie, op. cit. supra note 6, at 966, no 963. 1 Pothier, op. cit. supra note 75, at
359, no 594, admitted the application of this exception only if it appeared that
the creditor could not otherwise receive payment. This limitation on the
operation of the exception was not, however, incorporated into Art. 1701,
French Civil Code.
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of avoiding litigious redemption, the court, upon proper proof,
should refuse to recognize the exception.79 Finally, if in a dation
en paiement a balance in money is paid, it is a question of fact to
determine, in the light of the circumstances of the case, whether
the transaction should be classified as a dation en paiement within
the scope of the exception. 0
The third exception ("when the transfer has been made to
the possessor of the estate subject to the litigious right") has
given rise to criticism and to speculation regarding its applica-
tion."' It is generally supposed that this exception was designed
to cover the case in which a mortgage is in litigation and the
defendant in possession of the mortgaged property acquires the
mortgage debt for the purpose of confirming his right to pos-
session and hence there is no element of speculation present.82
It has been suggested that this third exception is meaningless and
unnecessary and is the result of legislative inadvertence in the
framing of the Code Napoleon.83
'Regarding the scope of application of Article 2654, it has been
indicated that the exceptions enumerated are exclusive rather
than illustrative,8 4 and also that the enumerated exceptions have
no application to the purchase of litigious rights by a court offi-
cer under Article 2447.85
The discussion in this comment has indicated the variety of
problems and results which flow from the application and inter-
pretation of the codal articles bearing upon the transfer of litigi-
ous rights in Louisiana civil law. The importance of this transac-
79. 19 Baudry-Lacantinerie, op. cit. supra note 6, at 966, no 964.
80. 10 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 7, at 366, no 323. For a full
discussion see 19 Baudry-Lacantinerie, op. cit. supra note 6, at 966-968, no 965.
81. 19 Baudry-Lacantinerie, op. cit. supra note 6, at 968, no 966: "Ii est
d4fficile de trouver des cas d'application de cette exception?' (It is difficult
to find cases of application of this exception.) 2 Colin et Capitant, op. cit.
supra note 15, at 565, no 623: "Ict il est d peu pros impossible de comprendre
quelle hypothdse la lot a voulu tqser." (Here it is almost impossible to under-
stand what hypothesis the law wished to provide for.)
82. 10 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 7, at 366, no 323.
83. 2 Colin et Capitant, op. cit. supra note 15, at 565, no 623.
84. 2 Guillouard, op. cit. supra note 6, at 440-441, no 897; 2 Colin et Capi-
tant, op. cit. supra note 15, at 565, no 623; 24 Laurent, op. cit. supra note 15, at
597-598, no 610.
85. See State v. Nix, 135 La. 811, 815, 66 So. 230, 232 (1914). Under this
view if an attorney at law purchased a litigious right from his coheir, re-
demption would not be permitted by reason of the exception under Article
2654, but the nullity of Article 2447 would apparently apply.
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tion and its consequences is particularly increased by the large
number of transfers of interests in oil and gas lands that are tak-
ing place at the present time. It may fairly be asserted that many
questions affecting the transfer of litigious rights will be sub-
mitted to the Louisiana courts in the near future. It is hoped that
this comment will serve the purpose of furnishing the civil law
viewpoint regarding such problems.
MARLIN RIsINGER
